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Abstract
Since Leeper’s (1991, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147) seminal paper, an exten-
sive literature has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, i.e., guarantees public debt stabilization
irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary policy can independently be committed to infla-
tion targeting. This can be pursued by following the Taylor principle, i.e., responding to upward
perturbations in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate.
This paper analyzes an optimizing framework in which the government can only finance public
expenditures by levying distortionary taxes. It is demonstrated that households’ market partic-
ipation constraints and Laﬀer-type eﬀects can render passive fiscal policies unfeasible. For any
given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary
policy independence is no longer possible. In such circumstances, the dynamics of public debt
can be controlled only by means of higher inflation tax revenues: inflation dynamics in line with
the fiscal theory of the price level must take place in order for macroeconomic stability to be
guaranteed. Otherwise, to preserve inflation control around the steady state by following the
Taylor principle, monetary policy must target a higher inflation rate.
JEL Classification: E63; H31; H63.
Keywords: Public Debt; Distortionary Taxation; Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules.
1 Introduction
The interaction between fiscal and monetary rules is one of the most controversial issues for
policy design. Since Leeper’s (1991) seminal contribution, modern theory has argued that
if fiscal policy is passive, that is, guarantees public debt stabilization irrespectively of the
inflation path, monetary policy can independently be committed to inflation targeting,
for example, by managing the nominal interest rate on the basis of a Taylor-type rule
(Taylor, 1993). Notably, a Taylor-type rule prescribes to implement an active monetary
policy, responding to increases in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the
nominal interest rate (the so-called Taylor principle). Conversely, if fiscal policy is active,
that is, does not guarantee public debt stabilization for each dynamic path of inflation,
monetary policy should be passive, responding to increases in inflation with a less than
one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate in order to rule out explosive dynamics
for public debt. These results are known as Leeper’s active/passive dichotomy, and have
been proved to hold in economies with either flexible or sticky prices (Woodford, 2003).
The type of fiscal feedback rules commonly used in the literature to model govern-
ment’s policy involves the adoption of lump-sum taxes. This paper demonstrates that in
the realistic case in which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, there are circumstances where
it can be unfeasible to implement passive fiscal policies.
This result comes from two relevant implications of distortionary taxes when agents
optimize: (i) the emergence of households’ market participation constraints; (ii) the
occurrence of two Laﬀer-type eﬀects generated by both tax and interest-rate feedback
rules.
We then prove that, for any given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level
of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence is no longer possible. Under
these circumstances, the dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means of
higher inflation tax revenues.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Leith and von Thadden (2008) are the first to
find the existence of bifurcations associated with the fiscal revenue maximizing tax rate.
In this paper we extend the issue by investigating the interactions of Laﬀer eﬀects on
fiscal revenues with Laﬀer eﬀects on inflation tax revenues. Hence we are able to derive
the implications of excessive debt levels in terms of monetary policy design.
Specifically, we demonstrate the occurrence of two possible alternative scenarios: if the
central bank is intended to preserve inflation control around the steady state by adopting
the Taylor principle, it must fix a suﬃciently higher target inflation rate; otherwise,
inflation dynamics of the type studied by the “fiscal theory of the price level” (eg., Leeper,
1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1994, 1995, 2003; Cochrane, 1998, 2005; Leeper and Yun,
2006) must occur in order for macroeconomic stability to be ensured.
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Fiscal and monetary policy design in the aftermath of the financial crisis erupted in
2007 is currently one the most debated issues in macroeconomics. As government debt
and deficits have sharply increased in several economies in the attempt to oﬀset the Great
Recession, the possible negative consequences of fiscal expansions on monetary policy
independence are now a pressing issue. The analytical results derived in this paper give
theoretical support to the argument recently advanced by Cochrane (2010) and Davig,
Leeper and Walker (2010) that the large fiscal deficits decided by governments to oﬀset
the crisis can lead to the “Laﬀer limit” beyond which inflation must endogenously jump
up according to the fiscal theory of the price level.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a continuous-time general equilib-
rium optimizing framework with lump-sum taxation and discusses the central features of
Leeper’s dichotomy. The recourse by the government to lump-sum taxes as an operating
instrument to implement passive fiscal policies is then removed. Section 3 concentrates
on asset taxation. Section 4 concentrates on income taxation. Section 5 presents the
conclusions.
2 A Baseline Monetary Model
In this Section, we set up a baseline continuous-time optimizing framework with lump-sum
taxation.1 In this context, we reconsider Leeper’s dichotomy. In the subsequent Sections,
we shall employ this model as a benchmark to study the consequences of distortionary
taxation.
Consider an endowment economy with a private sector and a public sector. The private
sector consists of a continuum of identical infinitely lived households.2 The representative
household has preferences given by the following lifetime utility function:
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [u(c,m) + f (g)] dt, (1)
where c is real private consumption, m are real money balances, and g is real govern-
ment consumption expenditure. The instantaneous utility function satisfies the following
conditions: uc, um, f 0 > 0 and ucc, umm, f 00 < 0. Consumption and real balances are
Edgeworth complements, so that ucm > 0.
1A continuous-time setup proves to be more convenient for the arguments developed in the present
paper. A discrete-time setup would not alter the essence of our analysis, but would complicate economic
intuitions, due to issues pertaining to timing conventions.
2Several issues on monetary and fiscal policy design in non-Ricardian economies in which new gener-
ations are born over time are studied by Benassy (2007).
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The household’s instant budget constraint in real terms is given by
c+ a˙+ m˙ = (i− π) a+ y − τ + τh − πm, (2)
where a is the stock of interest-bearing assets, i is the nominal interest rate paid on assets,
π is the inflation rate, y is a constant endowment of perishable goods, τ are lump-sum
taxes, and τh are government transfers.3 The right-hand-side of (2) represents disposable
income; the left-hand-side shows the uses of disposable income: consumption and saving;
the latter takes the form of increases in the stock of real assets and real balances. The
household is prevented from engaging in Ponzi’s games.
The public sector’s budget constraint in real terms is given by
b˙+ m˙ = g + τh + (i− π) b− τ − πm, (3)
where b is the stock of real public debt. Now, the right-hand-side of (3) represents govern-
ment deficit net of inflation tax revenues; the left-hand-side shows how the public sector
can finance its deficit: by issuing interest-bearing bonds and printing money.
The private sector chooses paths for private consumption, real balances, and bonds so
as to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the transversality conditions,
given the constant stream of the endowment y, and the initial conditions m (0) = m0 and
a (0) = a0. Optimization yields
uc(c,m) = λ, (4)
um(c,m) = λi, (5)
λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π − i) . (6)
Consistently with Leeper (1991), the choices of the public sector are described by two
rules, one pertaining to monetary policy, the other to fiscal policy.
The monetary authority fixes the nominal interest rate i in order to control the inflation
rate π around the target inflation rate π∗. To facilitate the analysis, and without loss of
generality, we assume π∗ > 0. We summarize such a feedback rule as
i = φ (π) , (7)
where φ (π) is continuous, non-decreasing, and strictly positive. Monetary policy is defined
3The budget constraint in real terms (2) is derived dividing by the price level the budget constraint
in nominal terms,
C + A˙+ M˙ = iA+ Y − T + Th,
where upper-case letters represent the corresponding nominal variables. Standard algebra leads to (2).
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as active when the monetary authority reacts more than proportionally to changes in
inflation, di/dπ = φ0 > 1, according to the so-called Taylor principle. Monetary policy is
defined as passive when the opposite occurs, φ0 < 1.
Let now consider fiscal policy. Public consumption g and transfers τh are assumed to
be exogenous and constant. Taxes are described by the feedback rule
τ = α¯+ αb, (8)
where α¯ is a constant parameter and α ≥ 0 captures the degree of reactiveness of taxes to
public debt. Fiscal policy is defined as passive when rule (8) guarantees stability of public
debt around the steady state for each dynamic path of inflation. That is, a passive fiscal
policy must respect the condition ∂b˙/∂b
¯¯¯
(π∗, b∗)
< 0. Conversely, fiscal policy is defined as
active when the fiscal rule (8) is such that ∂b˙/∂b
¯¯¯
(π∗, b∗)
> 0.
2.1 Equilibrium
Combining the two constraints (2) and (3), one obtains the goods’ market equilibrium
condition, y = c+ g, and the assets’ market equilibrium condition, b = a. Since y and g
are both exogenous and constant, it follows that c˙ = 0. Thus, from (4) and (5), we can
derive the relationships between m and i, and between λ and i:4
m = m (i) , (9)
with m0 < 0, and
λ = λ (i) , (10)
with λ0 < 0.
We can now derive the equilibrium equation describing inflation dynamics. Time
diﬀerentiating (10), using the costate equation (6) and the monetary policy rule (7), we
obtain
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ] , (11)
where H (π) = −λ/λ0φ0 > 0.
We next derive the equilibrium equation describing public debt dynamics. We start
from money money demand (9); using the monetary policy rule (7), diﬀerentiating with
respect to time, using the inflation dynamics equation (11), substituting into the budget
4For analytical details, see Appendix A.
4
constraint (3), and taking into account the fiscal policy rule (8), we obtain
b˙ = [φ (π)− π − α] b+ g + τh − α¯+K (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ]− πm [φ (π)] , (12)
where K (π) = λm0/λ0 > 0.
The dynamics of the economy is described by the system of diﬀerential equations
(11) and (12) in the variables (π, b). Since the monetary authority controls the nominal
interest rate, money supply is endogenous, and adjusts to demand. Money demand turns
out to depend on the inflation rate according to the function m [φ (π)]. The inflation rate
π results to be “chosen” indirectly by the private sector, thus being a jump variable. The
level of public debt b is instead the state variable in the system. We can then define
a perfect-foresight equilibrium as a pair of functions {π (t) , b (t)} that satisfy (11)-(12),
given the initial condition b (0) = b0 and the transversality conditions.
The system is in the steady state when b˙ = 0 and π˙ = 0. From (11), the steady-state
value of inflation π∗ is implicitly defined by
φ (π∗) = ρ+ π∗. (13)
Using (13) into (12) yields the steady-state value of debt b∗:
b∗ =
α¯− g − τh + π∗m (ρ+ π∗)
ρ− α . (14)
As in Leeper (1991), the parameter α¯ is chosen to make b∗ positive, and can be interpreted
as a “scale” parameter.
The system (11)-(12) and its steady-state solution (13)-(14) enable us to specify when
fiscal policy is passive and when it is active. We must compute the partial derivative of b˙
with respect to b, evaluated at the steady state (π∗, b∗). If the value of this derivative is
negative, fiscal policy is passive, and viceversa. We have
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ− α, (15)
Therefore, fiscal policy is passive if α > ρ. Note the economic meaning of this condition:
the implicit marginal tax rate on assets must be greater than the return on assets.
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2.2 Dynamics
To study the dynamics of the system (11)-(12), let linearize it around the steady state
(π∗, b∗): µ
π˙
b˙
¶
= J
µ
π − π∗
b− b∗
¶
. (16)
The Jacobian J is
J =
"
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
A21 ρ− α
#
, (17)
where A21 = (b∗ +K∗) (φ0 − 1) − m∗
³
1− η∗m/π
´
, with η∗m/π = |(π∗/m∗)m0φ0| denoting
the elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation, evaluated at (π∗, b∗).
Since b is a state variable and π a jump variable, we have a saddle path if the following
condition holds:
detJ = H∗ (φ0 − 1) (ρ− α) < 0. (18)
Condition (18) is satisfied either if
α > ρ and φ0 > 1
(i.e., under passive fiscal policy and active monetary policy) or if
α < ρ and φ0 < 1
(i.e., under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy). These are the two cases that
specify Leeper’s dichotomy. To see it at work, suppose to start from a value b0 6= b∗.
When α > ρ, the solution of the system (16) is given by
b = b∗ + (b0 − b∗) e−(α−ρ)t, (19)
π = π∗. (20)
Since, by assumption, fiscal policy is passive, the monetary authority is perfectly able to
control inflation according to the Taylor principle (φ0 > 1). The phase diagram of the
system (16) is presented in Figure 1. The slope of the locus b˙ = 0, given by (ρ− α) /A21,
depends on the sign of A21 which can be positive or negative. This is because inflation
has two opposite eﬀects on the level of public debt: on the one hand, it increases interest
payments by the government, since, by assumption, φ0 > 1; on the other hand, it increases
the inflation tax. In Figure 1, we have drawn the locus b˙ = 0 with positive slope, as it
is more likely to occur when inflation is relatively low. Nevertheless, this slope has no
relevance for the system dynamics, since in this case the saddle path coincides with the
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locus π˙ = 0. Note that equation (19) implies that the velocity through which debt
converges to the steady state is an increasing function of α.
When α < ρ, we must have φ0 < 1 for saddle-path stability to occur. The solution of
the system (16) becomes
b = b∗ + (b0 − b∗) eH
∗(φ0−1)t, (21)
π = π∗ + S (φ0, α) (b− b∗) , (22)
where S (φ0, α) = −TrJ/A21 > 0 measures the slope of the saddle path, which is greater
than the slope of the locus b˙ = 0. Since now fiscal policy is active (α < ρ), the monetary
authority cannot follow the Taylor principle. Assuming b0 > b∗, the jump in inflation
above the target π∗ allows the real public debt to decrease gradually and converge to the
steady state. This is because
∂b˙
∂π
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= A21 < 0.
The intuition is as follows. Inflation decreases the real interest rate φ (π) − π, increases
the inflation tax, and hence increases the monetary financing of deficit.5 The associated
phase diagram is illustrated in Figure 2. The jump in inflation needed to ensure stability
of real public debt is in accordance with the so-called “fiscal theory of the price level”.6
In synthesis, when fiscal policy is active, inflation dynamics depends on fiscal variables.
To summarize, Leeper’s dichotomy establishes that monetary policy is able to control
inflation consistently with the target level π∗, provided that fiscal policy takes the burden
of controlling public debt. In the opposite case, it is monetary policy that must take the
burden of bringing public debt back to the level b∗. Monetary policy can obtain this result
only by allowing inflation to jump above the level π∗ when b (t) > b∗.
Thus, Leeper’s dichotomy states that a necessary condition for monetary policy in-
dependence in the presence of public debt is that fiscal policy is passive. In the next
Sections, we explore the constraints that the fiscal authority can face in implementing a
passive policy, as soon as we relax the simplified case of lump-sum taxation.
3 The Model with Asset Taxation
So far we have emphasized that fiscal policy is passive when its primary objective is
public debt stabilization. To obtain this result, the implicit marginal tax rate α must be
5The term A21 can be decomposed in two parts. The first part is negative only when φ0 < 1. The
second part is negative if the economy is on the upward-sloping side of the Laﬀer curve for seignorage,
as it is eﬃcient.
6See Woodford (2003, pp. 311-319) for a discussion.
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greater than ρ, the steady-state real return on assets. Nevertheless, as long as taxation is
lump sum and equilibrium is competitive, so that the single household is atomistic, the
exogenous parameter α does not appear in the solution of the private agents’ maximizing
problem. This is because the representative household is not able to internalize taxation
into its optimal choice. However, the condition for a passive fiscal policy, α > ρ, will
feature a feasibility problem when we remove the assumption of lump-sum taxation, thus
enabling optimizing households to take into account the interaction between their choices
and the level of taxation. Intuitively, the consumer will never demand an asset when she
observes an after-tax negative return.7
Let us analyze the argument. Suppose that fiscal policy obtains its revenues by setting
the interest-bearing nominal assets as tax base,8 with a marginal tax rate equal to α. Tax
revenues in real terms are thus equal to τ = α¯ + αa. The households’ participation
constraint in the asset market imposes α < i. We shall now show that, by setting up the
model with such a participation constraint, fiscal policy cannot be passive.
The representative household’s instant budget constraint in real terms is now
c+ a˙+ m˙ = (i− π − α) a+ y − α¯+ τh − πm. (23)
Performing optimization yields
uc(c,m) = λ, (24)
um(c,m) = λ (i− α) , (25)
λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π + α− i) . (26)
The government’s budget constraint is now
b˙+ m˙ = g + τh + (i− π) b− α¯− αa− πm. (27)
In equilibrium, optimality conditions (24) and (25) can be written in implicit form as
follows:
m = m (i− α) , (28)
m0 < 0, and
λ = λ (i− α) , (29)
7Money is the only exception. There can be a positive demand for money also in the presence of a
negative return due to inflation, since money has a positive marginal utility.
8It can be shown that the same argument applies by assuming taxation on nominal interest payments.
For an analysis of macroeconomic stability under Taylor rules in a New Keynesian framework with
nominal interest taxation, see Edge and Rudd (2007).
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with λ0 < 0.
The closed-form diﬀerential-equation system in the variables (π, b) is then given by
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − α− ρ] , (30)
b˙ = [φ (π)− π − α] b+ g + τh +K (π) [φ (π)− π − α− ρ]− πm [φ (π)] . (31)
The steady-state solutions are given by
φ (π∗) = α+ ρ+ π∗, (32)
b∗ =
α¯− g − τh + π∗m (α+ ρ+ π∗)
ρ
. (33)
Using (31) and (32), it now follows that
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ. (34)
This proves that fiscal policy cannot be passive, for households internalize asset taxation
into their optimal decisions.
The implications for monetary policy are the following. Now, the Jacobian is
J =
"
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
A21 ρ
#
. (35)
The emergence of a saddle path requires φ0 < 1, that is, a passive monetary policy. The
monetary authority is no longer able to control inflation.
To conclude, a passive fiscal policy cannot rely on asset taxation only. There are two
alternatives to ensure macroeconomic stability. The first is to combine asset taxation with
an inflationary path brought about by a passive monetary policy, along the lines depicted
by the fiscal theory of the price level. But in this case, the monetary authority cannot be
independent, i.e., cannot adopt a Taylor-type rule with φ0 > 1, in order to set inflation
equal to the target level π∗. The second alternative is to raise revenues from another tax
base.
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4 The Model with Income Taxation
Let us focus on the implications of using income taxes as instrument of a passive fiscal
policy.9 Let τ y < 1 be the tax rate on income. The household’s budget constraint is given
by
c+ a˙+ m˙ = (i− π) a+ (1− τ y) y + τh − πm. (36)
Since y is exogenous, the optimality conditions are exactly the same as in Section 2.
The government’s budget constraint is given by
b˙+ m˙ = g + τh + (i− π) b− τ yy − πm. (37)
Fiscal policy is now described in terms of a feedback rule in which income taxation reacts
to public debt:
τ yy = α¯+ αb. (38)
The diﬀerential-equation system is the same as in Section 2. Hence, using income, as
opposed of debt, as tax base allows to reestablish Leeper’s dichotomy, so that a passive
fiscal policy allows monetary policy independence. However, this result is subject to the
following remark.
The steady-state marginal tax rate, τ ∗y, depends on the target inflation rate π∗, in-
dependently set by the monetary authority, and on the steady-state level of public debt
b∗:
τ ∗y = ρ
b∗
y
+
g + τh
y
− π
∗m (ρ+ π∗)
y
. (39)
From (39), the fiscal rule may violate the participation constraint, which imposes τ y < 1.
Because ∂τ ∗y/∂b∗ > 0, it emerges a limit on the level of steady-state public debt. Let bMy be
the threshold value of public debt beyond which the participation constraint is violated.
From (39), it follows that
bMy =
y − g − τh + π∗m (ρ+ π∗)
ρ
. (40)
If b0 > bMy , it is not feasible to implement a passive fiscal policy, for τ y (0) = (α¯+ αb0) /y >
1, which violates the constraint τ y < 1. A central bank intended to follow the Taylor
principle has to accept a higher steady-state inflation rate in order to raise the monetary
financing, thereby ensuring b0 ≤ bMy .
The foregoing remark, it can be argued, is purely theoretical. The condition b0 > bMy
9Linnemann (2006) studies the dynamic eﬀects of alternative fiscal rules in a New Keynesian model
with income taxation.
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could, in fact, result to be empirically implausible, at least for industrialized economies.
However, recall that thus far we have assumed an endowment economy. Households’
optimal decisions for consumption and saving do not aﬀect the level of y, thereby not
influencing fiscal revenues. Such an independence between households’ optimal decisions
and fiscal revenues no longer holds in a production economy. We shall examine the
consequences in what follows.
4.1 Laﬀer Eﬀects and Monetary Policy Independence
Suppose now the economy is populated by a continuum of identical household-firms. The
production technology of the representative household-firm is given by
y = l, (41)
where l represents labor supply. The household’s lifetime utility function takes the fol-
lowing form:
U =
∞Z
0
e−ρt [u(c,m) + f (g)− v (l)] dt, (42)
where u (c,m) is linearly homogeneous, so that uccumm − u2cm = 0, and v0, v00 > 0.
Using (41), the household-firm’s flow budget constraint is given by (36), and the
optimality conditions associated with the maximization problem become
uc(c,m) = λ, (43)
um(c,m) = λi, (44)
v0 (y) = λ (1− τ y) , (45)
λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π − i) . (46)
The government’s budget constraint is given by (37). Fiscal policy is described by rule
(38).
In equilibrium, conditions (43)-(44) can be expressed in implicit form as10
y = y (i, τ y) , (47)
with yi < 0, yτy < 0,
m = m (i, τ y) , (48)
10For analytical details, see Appendix B.
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with mi < 0, mτy < 0, and
λ = λ (i) , (49)
with λ0 < 0.
Using (47), the fiscal policy rule takes the following form:
τ yy (i, τ y) = α¯+ αb. (50)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to time yields
τ˙ y =
α
y
³
1− ηy/τy
´ b˙− τ yyi
y
³
1− ηy/τy
´ i˙, (51)
where ηy/τy =
¯¯
(τ y/y) yτy
¯¯
denotes the elasticity of output with respect to the marginal
rate. We assume ηy/τy < 1, i.e., that the economy is on the upward-sloping side of the
Laﬀer curve, for it results to be eﬃcient. Therefore, we can write
τ y = τ (b, i) , (52)
with τ b > 0 and τ i > 0.
The equilibrium dynamics can then be expressed in terms of the following diﬀerential-
equation system:
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ] , (53)
b˙=
[φ(π)−π−α] b+g+τh−α¯+K(π, b)[φ(π)−π−ρ]−πm {φ(π), τ [b, φ(π)]}
1 +mτyτ b
, (54)
where K (π, b) = λ
¡
mi +mτyτ i
¢
/λ0 > 0.
The steady-state solutions are given by
φ (π∗) = ρ+ π∗, (55)
b∗ =
α¯− g − τh + π∗m [ρ+ π∗, τ (b∗, ρ+ π∗)]
ρ− α . (56)
It follows that
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ− α− π∗mτyτ b
= ρ− α
⎡
⎣1 + π
∗mτy
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
⎤
⎦ , (57)
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where we have used the fact that (52) evaluated at the steady state yields
τ b = α/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
. (58)
To facilitate our discussion on dynamic stability, and make the present analysis easily
comparable with the results that apply in the benchmark model of Section 2, let us restrict
attention to the case in which
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
>
¯¯
π∗mτy
¯¯
. (59)
This condition says that the increase in fiscal revenues generated by an increase in the tax
rate is greater than the decrease in the inflation tax brought about by the associated fall
in money demand. Therefore, total revenues, i.e., fiscal revenues plus the inflation tax,
are assumed to raise following an increase in the tax rate. If condition (59) holds, then a
passive fiscal policy requires
α >
ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ . (60)
Since π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
< 0, the feedback parameter α must be greater than in the
endowment-economy case. The reason is clear. An increase in public debt causes the
tax rate to raise via the fiscal policy feedback rule. The increase in the tax rate brings
about a decrease in output and hence in money demand. This crowds out the inflation
tax, thereby requiring a more aggressive reaction by the fiscal authority. The foregoing
mechanism implies that the higher the elasticity of output with respect to the tax rate,
the higher parameter α ensuring a passive fiscal policy, as it is apparent from (60).
The Jacobian is given by
J =
⎡
⎣
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
B21 ρ− α
∙
1 +
π∗mτy
y∗
³
1−η∗y/τy
´¸
⎤
⎦ , (61)
where
B21 =
(b∗ +K∗) (φ0 − 1)−m∗
³
1− η∗m/π
´
− π∗mτyτ iφ0
1 +mτyτ b
does not aﬀect the two eigenvalues of the matrix and hence the conditions for saddle-path
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stability. The latter occurs if the following condition applies:
det J = H∗ (φ0 − 1)− ρ− α
⎡
⎣1 + π
∗mτy
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
⎤
⎦ < 0. (62)
Condition (62) is verified either if
α >
ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ and φ0 > 1
or if
α <
ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ and φ0 < 1.
If fiscal policy is passive, i.e., α > ρ/
h
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´i
, monetary policy inde-
pendence is ensured.
However, for a given target inflation rate independently set by the monetary authority,
the occurrence of Laﬀer-type eﬀects does pose a limit on the level of steady-state public
debt. Let indicate it by bMl . We shall demonstrate that beyond such a limit, a passive
fiscal policy becomes unfeasible.
To prove this result, first notice that in the steady state it must be that
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
= ρb∗ + g + τh. (63)
It follows that
bMl =
max
τ∗y
£
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢¤
− g − τh
ρ
. (64)
Maximization of total revenues with respect to the tax rate occurs when
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
= −π∗mτy . (65)
Since mτy < 0, total revenues are maximized on the left-hand-side of the Laﬀer curve.
This is precisely because, for a given target inflation rate, higher tax rates generate a
negative spillover on the inflation tax.
Now, substituting (65) into (57) yields
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, bMl )
= ρ. (66)
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This proves that if b0 > bMl , fiscal policy cannot be passive, for total revenues cannot be
suﬃcient to reduce public debt over time.
Remarkably, the presence of Laﬀer eﬀects on tax revenues causes the threshold level
of public debt to be lower with respect to the endowment-economy case. That is, we have
bMl < b
M
y .
A central policy implication emerges. If b0 > bMl , the dynamics of public debt can be
controlled only by means of inflation tax revenues. Monetary policy independence is no
longer possible.
4.2 Maximum Debt, Inflation Targeting, and the Fiscal Theory
of the Price Level
From (64), bMl is a function of the target inflation rate π
∗, bMl = b
M
l (π
∗). To study this
function, we apply the envelop theorem. We have
dbMl
dπ∗
=
τMyi +m∗ + π∗mi
ρ
(67)
=
m∗
ρ
µ
1− η∗m/π −
τMy∗
π∗m∗
η∗y/π
¶
,
where
τM = argmax
τ∗y
£
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢¤
.
From (67), dbMl /dπ
∗ > 0 as long as η∗m/π+
¡
τMy∗/π∗m∗
¢
η∗y/π < 1. We let π
M be the value
of the inflation rate such that η∗m/π +
¡
τMy∗/π∗m∗
¢
η∗y/π = 1, that is, db
M
l /dπ
∗ = 0.
Function bMl (π
∗) is illustrated in Figure 3, and has the following interpretation. For
π∗ = 0, we have η∗m/π = η
∗
y/π = 0, so that db
M
l /dπ
∗ = m∗/ρ > 0. As long as π∗ raises,
both elasticities η∗m/π and η
∗
y/π increase. This is because the increase in inflation causes
the nominal interest rate to raise, leading to a fall in both money demand and output.
As a result, total revenues, that is, fiscal revenues plus the inflation tax, increase as long
as π∗ < πM, reach a maximum at π∗ = πM, and decrease as long as π∗ > πM. Two
implications for the design of monetary policy rules arise.
First, if the monetary authority is intended to adopt the Taylor principle in order to
maintain inflation control around the steady state, and at the same time avoid explosive
paths in public debt, it must set an inflation target such that π∗0 ≤ π∗ ≤ πM, thereby
ensuring b0 ≤ bMl . It should be noted that such a scenario resembles the classic “unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic” example (Sargent andWallace, 1981). This is because a suﬃciently
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high target inflation rate must force the monetary authority to ensure a suﬃciently high
steady-state money growth — which is endogenous when the policy instrument is the
nominal interest rate — in order to rule out fiscal insolvency.
Second, if the monetary authority sets a target inflation rate such that π∗ < π∗0, then
we have b0 > bMl , and macroeconomic stability is guaranteed only by inflation dynamics
along the lines of the fiscal theory of the price level. In fact, the Jacobian evaluated at¡
π∗, bMl
¢
is given by
J(π∗, bMl ) =
"
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
B21 ρ
#
. (68)
Saddle-path stability requires that monetary policy is passive, φ0 < 1. Violating the Taylor
principle allows the inflation rate to jump up in order to rule out explosive dynamics in
public debt. Nevertheless, in this second case the monetary authority clearly loses inflation
control around the steady state.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper reconsiders the issue of monetary policy independence in the presence of public
debt in an environment in which the government cannot use lump-sum taxes to rule out
potentially explosive debt dynamics.
The question of monetary policy independence in the presence of public debt is no-
tably an old topic in macroeconomic theory, which dates back at least to the famous
“unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1983). But it does have im-
portant implications for the recent macroeconomic situation, which sees huge increases in
public deficits around the world to oﬀset the Great Recession started in 2007 and, as a
result, a drammatic accumulation of goverments’ debt: can monetary policies be indepen-
dent when an “exit strategy” for fiscal policies will be needed to preserve governments’
solvency?
The paper’s novel contributions to the literature are the following.
Our model can be read as a generalization — to an environment in which the fiscal
authority can only finance expenditures by levying distortionary taxes — of the seminal
contribution by Leeper (1991) on the interaction between active and passive monetary
and fiscal policies.
It is first demonstrated that when lump-sum taxes are not available, an households’
participation constraint emerges, which may render unfeasible to implement passive fiscal
policies, i.e., policies ensuring public debt stabilization. This rules out the possibility to
employ consumers’ assets as the only tax base, because a passive fiscal policy requires a
negative after-tax interest rate, which violates the households’ participation constraint in
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the asset market. Thus, in the paper we explore the issue of monetary policy independence
when the government raises revenues from an income tax base.
Using income as tax base to implement a passive fiscal policy leads to the emergence
of Laﬀer-type eﬀects. A novelty of this paper is to show that there exists an interac-
tion between Laﬀer eﬀects on fiscal revenues and Laﬀer eﬀects on inflation tax revenues.
Specifically, negative spillovers between the two Laﬀer curves arise. Because of such nega-
tive spillovers, the total revenues maximizing fiscal-tax rate occurs on the upward-sloping
side of the Laﬀer curve. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that for any given target
inflation rate independently chosen by the central bank, there always exists a threshold
level of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence vanishes.
In addition, we analyze the implications of such results for monetary policy design.
From this perspective, we show that the two popular theories that emphasize the threats
of public debt for monetary policy independence, namely the “unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the “fiscal theory of the price level” of
Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995, 2003), and Cochrane (1998, 2005) can
be considered in an unified framework.
Specifically, we construct a frontier of the maximum level of public debt as a function
of the target inflation rate, and show the emergence of two possible policy scenarios.
First, if the monetary authority aims to control inflation around the steady state, using
the Taylor principle, it must increase the target inflation rate. This scenario resembles
the classic “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”, in the sense that a higher target inflation
rate must imply a higher steady-state money growth (in the present framework the central
bank controls the nominal interest rate so that money supply is endogenous), and then a
higher debt monetization. However, it is shown that also the returns from the inflation
tax are decreasing, because of both a Laﬀer-type eﬀect on seignorage and the spillovers
between fiscal and inflation tax revenues. As a result, there exists an absolute maximum
for total revenues at which the gains from the inflation tax are completely crowded out
by the fall in fiscal revenues.
Second, if monetary authority aims to maintain the target inflation rate independently
fixed, it must give up the Taylor principle, so that the system falls in the environment in
which the fiscal theory of the price level holds.
In both the alternatives considered, the monetary authority loses its independence.
Of course, the analysis presented in this paper is based on a number of simplifying
assumptions needed to render the argument as transparent as possible. In particular, in
order to make the analysis directly comparable with the standard literature, and highlight
the implications of market participation constraints and of Laﬀer-type eﬀects for monetary
policy design, we worked under the assumption that government spending was exogenously
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set by fiscal authorities. However, should the economy embark on unsustainable levels of
public debt, governments do have the option to decrease the level of public expenditure
to rule out pressures on price-stability-oriented central banks, especially in the economies
with very high tax rates. This resembles, for instance, the type of “exit strategy” that
Euro Area Member States are currently trying to implement.
The theoretical analysis of such an additional scenario would lead away from the
interrelations between distortionary taxation and monetary policy, the subject of this
paper. This scenario is consistent, however, with the paper’s general point: the presence
of distortionary taxation per se might pose restrictions for the adoption of aggressive
monetary policy feedback rules of Taylor’s type capable of preserving price stability.
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Appendix A
Consider the two optimality conditions (4) and (5). Diﬀerentiating with respect to time,
recalling that c˙ = 0, we can write the results in matrix notation:Ã
ucm −1
umm −i
!Ã
m˙
λ˙
!
= λ
Ã
0
i˙
!
. (A.1)
Let ∆ = umm − ucmi < 0. Then we have
m˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯ 0 −1i˙ −i
¯¯¯¯
¯
∆
=
λ
∆
i˙, (A.2)
λ˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯ ucm 0umm i˙
¯¯¯¯
¯
∆
=
λucm
∆
i˙. (A.3)
We can thus write (9)-(10).
Appendix B
Consider the three optimality conditions (43)-(45). Diﬀerentiating with respect to time
and imposing the goods’ market equilibrium condition, we can express the results as
⎛
⎜⎝
ucc ucm −1
ucm umm −i
v00 0 − (1− τ y)
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
y˙
m˙
λ˙
⎞
⎟⎠ = λ
⎛
⎜⎝
0
i˙
−τ˙ y
⎞
⎟⎠ . (B.1)
Let Ψ = v00 (umm − ucmi) < 0. Hence, we have
y˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 0 ucm −1i˙ umm −i
−τ˙ y 0 − (1− τ y)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
Ψ
(B.2)
=
λ (1− τ y)ucm
Ψ
i˙− λ
v00
τ˙ y,
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m˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ucc 0 −1ucm i˙ −i
v00 −τ˙ y − (1− τ y)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
Ψ
(B.3)
=
λ [v00 − (1− τ y) ucc]
Ψ
i˙+
λ (ucm − ucci)
Ψ
τ˙ y,
λ˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ucc ucm 0ucm umm i˙
v00 0 −τ˙ y
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
Ψ
(B.4)
=
λv00ucm
Ψ
i˙.
We can thus write (47)-(49).
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Figure 1: Passive Fiscal Policy and Active Monetary Policy
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Figure 2: Active Fiscal Policy and Passive Monetary Policy
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Figure 3: Maximum Debt and Inflation Target
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